Leading-effect vs. Risk-taking in Dynamic Tournaments: Evidence from a Real-life Randomized Experiment by Mueller-Langer, Frank & Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick
Frank Mueller-Langer and Patrick Andreoli-Versbach:
Leading-effect vs. Risk-taking in Dynamic
Tournaments: Evidence from a Real-life Randomized
Experiment
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2013-6
Department of Economics
University of Munich
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Online at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15452/
Leading-e¤ect vs. Risk-taking in Dynamic
Tournaments: Evidence from a Real-life Randomized
Experiment
Frank Mueller-Langer and Patrick Andreoli-Versbach
 Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law,
Munich Center for Innovation and Entrepreneurship Research (MCIER),
International Max Planck Research School for Competition and Innovation (IMPRS-CI)
 Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, MCIER, IMPRS-CI,
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich
June 17, 2013
Abstract
Two order e¤ectsmay emerge in dynamic tournaments with information feed-
back. First, participants adjust e¤ort across stages, which could advantage the leading
participant who faces a larger e¤ective prizeafter an initial victory (leading-e¤ect).
Second, participants lagging behind may increase risk at the nal stage as they have
nothing to lose(risk-taking). We use a randomized natural experiment in professional
two-game soccer tournaments where the treatment (order of a stage-specic advantage)
and team characteristics, e.g. ability, are independent. We develop an identication
strategy to test for leading-e¤ects controlling for risk-taking. We nd no evidence of
leading-e¤ects and negligible risk-taking e¤ects.
Keywords: Tournaments, order e¤ects, leading-e¤ect, risk-taking, randomized natural
experiments
JEL classication: C93; C21; D01; L83
Address: Dr. Frank Mueller-Langer (Corresponding author): Max Planck Institute for In-
tellectual Property and Competition Law, Marstallplatz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany; E-mail:
frank.mueller-langer@ip.mpg.de; Tel: +49 89 242 46 453. Patrick Andreoli-Versbach; E-mail:
patrick.andreoli-versbach@imprs-ci.ip.mpg.de.
1
1 Introduction
Tournaments are widely used in corporations, politics and sports to provide incentives to
work hard or to select the best agents. A key aspect of tournaments is that participants
are rewarded on the basis of their relative rather than absolute performance. In addition
participants often compete in a dynamic setting with information feedback and under asym-
metric conditions. Two fund managers acting on di¤erent markets and competing to attract
new funds might get intermediate feedback of performance and change their strategy before
the investorschoice of asset allocation. In the US the major party candidates are deter-
mined through a sequence of state-level primary elections where candidates can constantly
monitor their interim rank and change their strategies accordingly. Most of the literature
on tournaments points out how incentives mitigate the conicting objectives between prin-
cipal and agents inducing higher levels of e¤ort. However, less is known on the e¤ect of
revealing information on relative performance during a dynamic tournament. In this setting
e¤ort is not the only choice variable and risk-taking might cause order e¤ects. By order
e¤ects, we mean the advantage or disadvantage to a player when performing either in a
given sequence or under di¤erent conditions that are determined by the regulation of the
tournament. Two distinct order e¤ects might arise in a dynamic setting with intermediate
information feedback where both e¤ort and risk-taking are relevant. First, there might be a
leading-e¤ect. Teams taking the lead at the beginning of the tournament might experience
an encouragement-e¤ect and/or teams lagging behind might feel discouraged. This e¤ect is
due to the fact that the leading (lagging) player has an incentive to exert more (less) e¤ort
as she faces a larger (smaller) e¤ective prizefrom winning the second game (Konrad and
Kovenock, 2009; Malueg and Yates, 2010). Second, teams lagging behind might increase
risk-taking at nal stages of the tournament as they have nothing to lose(Cabral, 2003;
Hvide, 2002).
In this paper we take advantage of a unique natural experiment with 1,146 observations
where highly paid professionals have strong incentives to compete and know the setting very
well. In two-game soccer knock-out competitions, teams are randomly drawn to have an
advantage (home game) either in the rst or second game. The team randomly drawn to
play the rst game at home wins the rst game more often (53% home win, 26% draw and
21% away win) and thus might benet from a leading-e¤ect. The team playing the second
game at home is more likely to lag behind after the rst game and thus might increase risk-
taking in the second game. Using this real life situation that guarantees internal validity we
investigate the selection e¢ ciency of tournaments with information feedback and asymmetric
initial conditions.
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The main concern of using a natural experiment as opposed to an experiment in the labora-
tory is that strategies, and in specic e¤ort and risk choices, are unobserved. By exploiting
our rich dataset we develop an identication strategy capable of distinguishing the relevance
of each e¤ect, i.e. leading-e¤ect and risk-taking, on the winning probability of teams.
Most of the literature focuses on how tournament design inuences the behavior of partici-
pants and in particular on the incentive mechanism of tournaments (Knoeber and Thurman,
1994; Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Lynch, 2005). Another strand of literature elaborates on
the comparison between tournaments and other performance schemes (Baker et al., 1994;
Lazear, 2000; Oyer, 1998).
Less research is done on how the dynamic structure of tournaments a¤ects the ex-ante win-
ning probabilities of participants through order e¤ects. This is of great importance for two
reasons. First, from the perspective of the organizer, tournaments are often used as a selec-
tion mechanism to identify the best candidates, e.g. for job promotion or research grants.
Better agents should win the tournament. This may not be the case when the regulation
randomly attributes a considerable advantage to one player. Second, from the perspective of
the participant, it is not fair if one player receives an advantage due to a randomized order
of play. Thus, in dynamic tournaments, the order of interaction must be carefully designed.
We benet from a randomized natural experiment in soccer knock-out competitions with two
games in which each team is randomly drawn to play either the rst or the second game at
home. Given the robustly identied result that home teams have an advantage (Clarke and
Norman, 1995; Ferrall and Smith, 1999; Neave and Wolfson, 2003; Pollard, 1986), we inves-
tigate whether the random allocation of this advantage in either the rst or second game has
an impact on the probability of winning the knock-out. The setting of a knock-out allows us
to go beyond what can usually be done in empirical work on selection e¢ ciency in corporate
tournaments where many variables are not observable and the data is not available. Sport is
in many ways the perfect environment for testing economic theories about decision-making.1
There is an abundance of readily available data, the goals of participants in sporting con-
tests are relatively uncomplicated and the outcomes are extremely clear. Szymanski (2003)
concludes that sports data is a valuable source for economists trying to understand the rela-
tionship between tournament structure and e¤ort choices and to test theoretical predictions
against the data.
Our setting of a natural experiment allows us to study how the randomly assigned order of
advantages might a¤ect winning probabilities. Without order e¤ects, teamswinning prob-
1Sports contests have been successfully used to show the use of mixed strategies (Chiappori et al., 2002),
risk aversion (Pope and Schweitzer, 2011), cheating (Moul and Nye 2009), and the impact of the ability to
adapt performance to pressure on overall career success (Dohmen, 2009; González-Díaz et al., 2012).
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abilities should be independent of whether they play the rst or second game at home. We
refer to this condition as neutral structureof the tournament. If, however, order e¤ects play
a relevant role, professional and experienced teams in high stake environments will exploit
such favorable conditions by changing their strategy and increase their winning probability.
Our empirical analysis relates to two strands of literature on dynamic tournaments2 that
focus on two aspects of order e¤ects: leading-e¤ect and risk-taking.
Regarding the leading-e¤ect, Malueg and Yates (2010) and Ferrall and Smith (1999) study
the existence of strategic e¤ects in dynamic tournaments using individual and team level
sports data, respectively. Malueg and Yates (2010) nd that players in best-of-three tennis
tournaments strategically adjust e¤orts across sets conditional on the intermediate score.
Given equal ex-ante abilities, players that take the lead by winning the rst set exert higher
e¤ort in the second set than the opponents as they face a larger e¤ective prizefrom winning
the second set.3 Ferrall and Smith (1999) analyze data from team sports such as basket-
ball, baseball and hockey and do not nd evidence of leading-e¤ects.4 Klumpp and Polborn
(2006) model US presidential primaries that consist of a sequence of elections within a politi-
cal party in di¤erent districts between two candidates. They nd evidence of strategic e¤ects.
Consistent with empirical evidence, the winner of early districts is endogenously more likely
to win later districts than the loser. A possible explanation for this mixed evidence is that
incentives within teams may attenuate incentive e¤ects across games which might explain
why strategic e¤ects are present in settings where individuals rather than teams compete
(Ferrall and Smith, 1999).
In addition to e¤ort choices, in many situations agents may also choose risk to inuence their
performance. Fund managers could pick riskier assets and managers opt for riskier invest-
ments or production technologies if they are lagging behind. In such cases the latter results
on leading-e¤ects do not hold true in general. When players can choose both e¤ort and risk,
players choose riskier actions and lower e¤ort in equilibrium as compared to the equilib-
rium e¤ort without risk-taking (Hvide, 2002). Also, when risk is the only choice variable,
the selection e¢ ciency of tournaments deteriorates (Hvide and Kristiansen, 2003). Cabral
(2003) sets up a model in which rms can choose between a safe, low-variance and a risky,
2See Konrad (2009) for a thorough overview of the literature on dynamic contests.
3See also Konrad and Kovenock (2009) who analyze multi-battle, all-pay auctions and nd that, with in-
termediate prizes, even a large lead by one player does not fully discourage the laggard. Without intermediate
prizes, laggards may only drop out if they are lagging too far behind.
4Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) study penalty kicks with randomly assigned order of who shoots
rst and nd that teams randomly allocated to take the rst kick win 60.5% of the shoot-outs. They ascribe
this e¤ect of sequential moves to psychological pressureon the kicker of the second-kicking team. Note,
however, that Kocher et al. (2012) cannot replicate this positive e¤ect on teams kicking rst in a larger
sample of shoot-outs with 540 observations.
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high-variance research and development strategy. He provides su¢ cient conditions under
which the rm lagging behind chooses a riskier strategy than the leader. As compared to a
model without risk-taking, weaker players or players lagging behind choose riskier strategies
because they have nothing to lose.
Due to the di¢ culty to analyze e¤ort and risk choices separately the empirical literature con-
rming the theoretical result of gambling for resurrectionis relatively underdeveloped. One
notable exception are Genakos and Pagliero (2012) who study the impact of interim rank on
risk-taking and performance in weightlifting competitions. They nd that risk-taking takes
an inverted-U relationship with interim rank where competitors that are ranked just behind
the leader take more risk. In addition Chevalier and Ellison (1997) nd that mutual funds
with relatively low mid-year performance increase fund volatility, relative to the funds with
relatively high mid-year performance.
The view that the player lagging behind increases risk-taking is not unanimous. Kräkel
and Sliwka (2004) analyze a two-player tournament where players have asymmetric abili-
ties. They show that depending on the interplay of e¤ort and probability of winning and
the degree of asymmetry between agents diverse equilibria are possible. For example, both
agents may choose a high or low risk strategy. Nieken and Sliwka (2010) analyze a static
model in which a leading player and a lagging player decide between risky and safe strategies.
They show that the decisions depend on the correlation between contestantsoutcomes of
risky strategies. If the correlation is low, the player lagging behind increases risk whereas
the leader plays safe in order to protect her lead. However, if the correlation is high, it
might be optimal for the leader to follow the laggards risky strategy.5 In a high-correlation
environment it may well be attractive for the leading agent to imitate the competitors risky
strategy. Independent of whether the strategy fails or succeeds the relative position remains
unchanged when the strategy can be exactly replicated. Thus, choosing the risky strategy
becomes a means to protect the lead. If the outcomes of risky strategies are uncorrelated
the imitation of risk-taking is ruled out from the outset.
Building on this theoretical framework on leading-e¤ects and risk-taking we test two alter-
native predictions. First, teams playing the rst game at home have an advantage at the
beginning of the tournament and thus take the lead more often than teams playing the sec-
ond game at home. This leading-e¤ect might favor teams playing the rst game at home
by encouraging them to exert more e¤ort or discourage the team lagging behind to exert
5Taylor (2003) sets up a model in which two heterogeneous fund managers in terms of midyear performance
compete for new cash inows at the end of the year. He shows that the outcome in which the lagging manager
gambles and the leading manager indexes only holds if one of the managers is an exogenous benchmark.
However, if both managers are active and the outcomes of their risky strategies are correlated, the leading
manager is more likely to gamble.
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e¤ort.6 Second, if the correlation between the contestantsoutcomes of risky strategies is
low, teams lagging behind at the end of the tournament might increase risk-taking as they
have nothing to lose. This gambling for resurrection could advantage the team playing
the second game at home. If, however, the correlation is high teams might copy the rivals
risk-taking strategy and risk-taking may be constant across teams and games. As both ef-
fects might be simultaneously taking place, we will rst analyze risk-taking both dependent
and independent on past performance. As the correlation between contestantsoutcomes of
risky strategies is rather high in soccer7 we show that risk choices are constant and do not
depend on past performance. This result is in line with the theoretical predictions by Nieken
and Sliwka (2010). We then test for leading-e¤ects given constant risk choices and nd no
evidence of a signicant e¤ect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data. In Section
3, we analyze risk-taking in each game of the knock-out and conditional on the result of the
rst game. Section 4 provides evidence on the absence of leading-e¤ects. Section 5 discusses
the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
We construct a dataset with 1,146 games and thus 573 knock-outs where the home advantage
is randomly assigned by the regulation of the Union of European Football Associations
(UEFA).8 The data come from the UEFA. Table 1 summarizes the data. The dataset consists
of games played in the UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa League9 from 1955 until
2009. Observations from 564 games are from the period of 2005-2009 (80 from 2000-2004
and 502 from 1955-1999).
[TABLE 1 HERE]
6Note that both encouragement as well as discouragement-e¤ect go in the same direction, i.e. they
advantage the leading team. In this paper we therefore focus on measuring the impact of the random order
of play on the selection e¢ ciency of dynamic tournaments. The distinction between encouragement and
discouragement-e¤ect is beyond the scope of the paper.
7Grund and Gürtler (2005) analyze single soccer games. They show that as the opponent increases risk-
taking it is easier for the other team to score a goal. Intuitively, in the extreme risk-taking case where a
team is lagging behind and the goalkeeper joins the striker in the last few minutes of the game to try to
equalize the result, it will be very easy for the opposing team to score a goal.
8The UEFA is the administrative and controlling body of the European soccer association. UEFA repre-
sents most of the national soccer associations of Europe, runs national and club competitions and controls
the prize money, regulations and media rights for those competitions.
9UEFA Champions League replaced the European Champion ClubsCup after season 1991/1992. UEFA
Europa League replaced the UEFA Cup after season 2008/2009.
6
For each game, we observe the date, result, location, knock-out round, tournament, and
whether the team passed the knock-out round by goal di¤erence, away goals rule, extra time,
or penalty kicks. Table 2 summarizes the relative importance of each UEFA regulation.10
The goal di¤erence rule is by far the most important one. In the last column, we summarize
the winning probability of a single game from the perspective of the home team. The data
on home winning probabilities show that the place where the game is disputed signicantly
a¤ects the outcome. This result is therefore in line with previous literature on the advantage
of playing at home.11
[TABLE 2 HERE]
3 Natural experiment
We study a randomized natural experiment in which the order of an advantage, and thus
treatment and control group, are determined via explicit randomization. One team is drawn
to play the rst game home, and the other to play the second game home. In this natural
experiment professionals know exactly the tournaments setting, the payo¤s and incentives
are very high, and the process of allocating teams is random. Page and Page (2007) an-
alyze the same knock-out setting. The most important di¤erence between this paper and
Page and Page (2007) is that we develop an identication strategy capable of distinguishing
between the leading-e¤ect and risk-taking. In addition Page and Page (2007) do not distin-
guish between random and non-random knock-out rounds. The key di¤erence is that in the
non-random knock-out rounds the regulation states that better teams play their last game
home. Page and Page (2007) nd a positive and signicant e¤ect of playing the second game
at home (55% vs. 45%), but cannot distinguish between the risk-taking e¤ect and the higher
ability of teams playing the last game home. These two confounding variables would favor
the teams playing the second game at home, but it is not clear which one, if any, should be
the driver of the 45% vs. 55% advantage.
In contrast, we focus on knock-out rounds where the order of the advantage is randomly
assigned. This allows us to exploit the properties of a natural experiment and specically
10See the appendix for the structure of the knock-out and the four ways of winning the knock-out.
11The average goal di¤erence between home and away team is .72 goals in our sample of 1,146 games. This
positive di¤erence is signicantly di¤erent from zero (same number of home and away goals) at a p-value
lower than .01. Other studies (Carmichael and Thomas, 2005; Greenhough et al., 2002; Clarke and Norman,
1995; Pollard, 1986) estimate this advantage to be between .43 and .66 goals in national soccer leagues.
However, they also nd that the home advantage increases signicantly in the geographical distance between
the two teams. Hence, our ndings which are based on international games between more distant teams are
in line with the existing literature on the home advantage.
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the fact that team characteristics as ability and the treatment e¤ect, i.e. the order of home
games, are independent.12
In the nal phase of the major European soccer tournaments, such as the Champions League
and the Europa League, teams are randomly drawn to play against each other with a time
interval of one to three weeks between the two games. There is a fundamental di¤erence
between knock-outs in the nal rounds of the tournament, i.e. the quarter- and semi-nals,
and the qualication rounds for the main tournament. For instance, Article 8.07 of the Reg-
ulations of the UEFA Champions League 2008/09 prescribes that the ties are determined
by means of a draw. The club drawn rst plays the rst leg of the tie at home. With
respect to the qualication phase, Article 8.01 of the Regulations of the UEFA Champions
League 2008/09 states that the UEFA administration seeds clubs for the qualifying phase,
the play-o¤s and the group stage (...) in accordance with the club coe¢ cient ranking estab-
lished at the beginning of the season (...)".13 Thus, teams are not randomly drawn to play
in a given order, but better teams are allocated to play the second game at home. In light
of this fundamental di¤erence, causal inference about the order can only be drawn from the
nal phase. Therefore, we analyze the 1,146 games where the home advantage is randomly
assigned.
Because of the random draw, the Average Treatment E¤ect (ATE) is dened as the di¤er-
ence between the two groupsmean winning probabilities. Let yS (yF ) denote the winning
probability of a team playing the second (rst) game at home, and let w denote the alloca-
tion of home and away games. The average treatment e¤ect is ATES = ATEF = E(yjw =
1)  E(yjw = 0), if w is statistically independent of yS and yF .
As the theoretical work on dynamic tournaments points out, two e¤ects going in opposite
directions may emerge from such a setting. First, teams may get discouraged (encouraged)
after an initial loss (victory) which gives them information feedback on their opponents
ability. Second, teams lagging behind might choose riskier strategies.14
The econometric problem arising from these di¤erent strategies can be illustrated as follows.
Let "S;t ("F;t) be the risk-taking in the t = first; second game of team S (F ) that plays the
12We also tried an identication strategy similar to Malueg and Yates (2010) and selected equally skilled
teams using the smallest possible positive goal di¤erence of the rst game, i.e. a one goal lead by the home
team. The results on leading-e¤ect and risk-taking were unchanged.
13Article 6.09 states that the quarter-nal pairings are determined by means of a draw. The quarter-nals
are played under the cup (knock-out) system, on a home-and-away basis (two legs).Article 6.10 prescribes
that the semi-nal pairings are determined by means of a draw.The same rules apply to the Round of
last 16 as well as the quarter- and semi-nals of the Europa League.
14A natural way in which coaches of teams that are lagging behind might increase risk-taking is by
substituting defensive players by more o¤ensive ones. Using data on the German soccer league Grund and
Gürtler (2005) provide evidence that coaches adopt this strategy. However, risk-taking does not pay o¤ in
this setting.
8
second (rst) game at home. Then E(yjw = f1; 0g) 6= E(yjw = f1; 0g; "F;t; "S;t), as both
choice variables "F;t and "S;t are correlated with the random allocation of the advantage. If
we do not control for them, we would have a biased estimator of order e¤ects as the analysis
would su¤er from an omitted variable bias. Therefore, we must rst understand what type
of model drives teamsrisk choices. As shown by Nieken and Sliwka (2010), if the correlation
between contestantsoutcomes of risky strategies is low, then there is an incentive for the
team lagging behind to increase risk. If this correlation is high, teams tend to copy the rivals
strategy more often. Specically to our setting, if the correlation is high F anticipates the
risk strategy that S chooses in the second game and chooses the same risk level in the rst
game. Under this hypothesis E(yjw = f1; 0g) = E(yjw = f1; 0g; "F ; "S) as risk choices are
identical across games of the knock-out and thus the ATE is the di¤erence of the winning
probabilities given the order of the home game. In the next section we provide indirect
empirical evidence that the correlation between contestantsoutcomes of risky strategies is
rather high and thus risk-taking is indeed constant across games and unconditional on past
performance.
3.1 Risk-taking unconditional on past performance
The e¤ects of risk-taking can be tested in two ways: rst, by comparing the distribution of
results (home win, draw, away win) in the rst and second game, and second, by comparing
the number of goals scored across games. These two measures are interrelated and capture
whether there is evidence that risk-taking inuences the results across games. Intuitively,
if risk-taking di¤ers across games, it should shift the distribution of results towards the
extremes (more home/away wins) and increase the number of goals at the end of the knock-
out, when one team is lagging behind. We start by analyzing the rst measure, i.e. the
distribution of results (home (win), draw and away (win)), in the two games.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
If risk-taking plays an important role at the end of the knock-out, we should observe
signicantly fewer draws in the second game and more home/away wins as the e¤ect of
an increase in risk would be to shift probability from the median (draw) to the extremes
(win/lose). Teams lagging behind towards the end of the knock-out have nothing to lose and
thus might be indi¤erent between a draw and a defeat. Note that monetary incentives to win
the knock-out are very high and often exceed e 3 million,15 which points to the fact that
winning the knock-out really matters. Figure 1 shows the relative frequency of each outcome
15For instance, in addition to the revenues generated from broadcasting, merchandising, sponsoring and
tickets, each of the 32 teams that play in the Champions League receives a minimum payment of e 9.3
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for 1,146 games where the home advantage is randomly assigned. To test the hypothesis of
constant risk-taking in both games we perform a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
on the distribution of outcomes. The test cannot reject equality of distribution across games
with a p-value of .89. The distributions do not di¤er, a nding that is in line with our
hypothesis that risk choices are constant over games of the knock-out. The second measure
we use to evaluate the relevance of risk-taking is the distribution of the sum of the home and
away team goals across games. If at the end of the knock-out one team is lagging behind
and has an incentive to increase risk-taking, we should observe that the distribution of the
sum of the goals is more skewed to the right (more goals) in the second game. The average
number of goals in the rst (second) game is 2.48 (2.7) implying a di¤erence of .22 goals
across games. Doing a two-sided t-test with 573 observations per sample, the .22 di¤erence
is statistically signicant at a p-value of .031. While this might point to an increase in risk-
taking at the end of the knock-out, the magnitude is very small, one goal more every ve
games, which points to a negligible e¤ect of risk-taking on the outcome of the knock-out.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
To conrm this assertion we plot the histogram of the sum of home and away team goals
in the two games in Figure 2 and perform a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to evaluate
whether the distributions are signicantly di¤erent. Using our 1,146 games, 573 in the rst
game and 573 in the second game, we cannot reject equality of distribution functions at a
p-value of .24. Thus, while there is some evidence that the number of goals increases in the
second game, the magnitude is very small and the distribution of the sum of goals is not
statistically di¤erent across games.
3.2 Risk-taking conditional on past performance
Even though we cannot reject that the distributions of goals are equal across games, strategies
across games might not be independent and thus teams might react to past performance.
In particular, teams that lost the rst game might increase their risk-taking. This strategy,
if e¤ective, might lower the selection e¢ ciency of tournaments as predicted by Hvide and
Kristiansen (2003). We test this by relating the sum of home and away goals in the second
game to the goal di¤erence (home-away) in the rst game. If risk-taking depends on past
performance we would expect that the sum of goals in the second game increases if the
absolute goal di¤erence in the rst game increases, i.e. we should observe a U-shaped relation
million plus rewards of reaching the round of last 16 (e 3 million), the quarter-nals (e 3.3 million), the
semi-nals (e 4.2 million) and the nal (e 5.6 million). UEFA (2012). Financial Report 2010/11. UEFA,
Nyon: Switzerland.
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between past performance (goal di¤erence) and the sum of goals.16 A team lagging behind
in the second game, i.e. with a negative goal di¤erence in the rst game, might increase risk-
taking as they have nothing to lose which should increase the number of goals in the second
game. The team lagging behind might substitute a defensive player for a more o¤ensive one
as shown in Grund and Gürtler (2005) which increases the likelihood that the team lagging
behind equalizes while at the same time makes it easier for the leading team to score. Both
e¤ects point to an increase of the sum of home and away goals in the second game.
If, however, the correlation between contestantsoutcomes of risky strategies is relatively
high, it might be optimal for both the leading and lagging team to choose the same risk level
and thus the sum of goals in the second game should be independent from the goal di¤erence
of the rst game.
In Figure 3 we plot the mean, interquartile range and 95% condence interval of the sum
of home and away goals in the second game conditional on the goal di¤erence (home-away)
in the rst game. We can test two alternative hypotheses regarding risk-taking across the
two games. First, teams lagging behind increase their risk-taking. Thus there should be
a positive relation between the number of goals that a team is lagging behind after the
rst game and the total number of goals scored in the second game. Second, risk-taking
is constant across games and thus there is no relation between past goal di¤erence and the
sum of goals in the second game. As Figure 3 shows, the sum of goals in the second game is
independent of the goal di¤erence in the rst game. In order to test the graphic relation we
perform an OLS regression with robust standard errors as given by
sumgoalsH+A;2 = 0 + 1goaldifH A;1 + 2goaldif
2
H A;1 + u2 (1)
We dene sumgoalsH+A;2 as the sum of home (H) and away (A) goals in the second game.
u2 is the error term. Let goaldifH A;1 (goaldif 2H A;1) be the di¤erence (squared) between
home and away goals in the rst game. If risk-taking plays a role we should observe a U-
shaped relation between past performance (goal di¤erence) and the sum of goals. Thus, b1
should be insignicant and b2 should be positive and signicant. Estimating the regression
using OLS we nd that the constant is positive, 2.69, and signicant at the 1% level. b1
and b2 are highly insignicant with a p-value of .77 and .97, respectively. These results
conrm the graphic evidence that there is no relation between past performance and current
risk-taking.
16If S is lagging behind by a large goal di¤erence after the rst game it could increase risk-taking which
in turn leads to a higher total number of goals in the second game. Symmetrically, if F is leading by a
large number of goals it will be easier for F to score additional goals in the second game as S increases its
risk-taking. In contrast, if the goal di¤erence between teams is rather low, we would expect risk-taking and
thus the total number of goals in the second game to be low.
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[FIGURE 3 HERE]
4 On the absence of leading-e¤ects
We can test for leading-e¤ects using a natural experiment in soccer knock-outs if risk-taking
is constant across games and teams. As we show in the previous section, there is no evidence
that risk-taking plays a signicant role. Thus, we can exploit the properties of the natural
experiment.
The two-game structure in soccer competitions should be a neutral structure absent of order
e¤ects. The overall winning probability for S, the team playing second home, is 51.8%.
While the point estimate is slightly above 50%, it is far from being signicantly so. For
preliminary evidence we perform a two-sided binomial test with the hypothesis that the
order of play does not signicantly inuence the probability of winning. Performing the test
with a sample size of 1,146 games and H0: 50%, we get a p-value of .31 so that we cannot
reject the hypothesis of the mean to be 50%.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
In Table 3, we perform an in-depth analysis by adding various control variables. We use
a logit model17 where the dependent variable, wini, is binary and equals 1 if the team i wins
the knock-out. As our observations are not independently drawn from the same population,
but one team winning the knock-out implies the other losing it, we cluster the standard
errors by the knock-out ID.
In the rst specication of Table 3, we regress wini on SHi, a dummy indicating whether team
i plays the second game at home. As specication 1 shows, SH is indeed insignicant. In
the second specication, we add an interaction term between SH and time dummy variables
from 1955 to 2009 to test whether time xed e¤ects are present. In specication 3, we add
an interaction between Champions League games and SH. As better teams play for higher
stakes in this competition as opposed to the Europa League, it might be that these teams
are more capable of exploiting their advantage deriving from order e¤ects. As the regression
results show, this is not the case. Statistically, there is no signicant di¤erence between
SH in Champions League or Europa League. In specication 4, we include both time xed
e¤ects and the Champions League dummy but results are unchanged. In specication 5, we
include round dummies. As it might be that order e¤ects are stronger in the nal knock-out
rounds of the tournaments when stakes are highest, we include four interactions between
round dummies and SH. As specication 5 shows, none of them is individually signicant
17Using a probit model instead does not qualitatively change the results.
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at the usual condence levels. In the last specication we add all control variables but none
has a signicant e¤ect on the probability of winning given that the team played the second
game home and SH is insignicant.
In this two-game tournament context, we nd no evidence for leading-e¤ects. On average,
teams playing home second have a slight advantage, but this is not signicantly di¤erent from
no-advantage. The evidence provided in Table 3 and in the previous section on risk-taking
shows that allocating symmetric advantages at di¤erent stages of tournaments is fair from
the playersperspectives and guarantees selection e¢ ciency from the tournament organizers
perspective.
5 Discussion
Our empirical strategy rests on two testable predictions from the theoretical literature on
tournaments (leading-e¤ect and risk-taking). Even though our strategy addresses each pre-
diction separately there might be some concerns on the strategies and beliefs teams have
during the game which we do not observe. For example, we do not observe the beliefs of
players or coaches. If they believe to be disadvantaged by their order of home play, this
might cause an (unobservable) decrease in e¤ort. While such beliefs are unobservable, we
address the two main causes of order e¤ects and provide evidence that neither of them plays
a signicant role. In soccer there might be additional unobserved strategies, as for example
players might get substituted for the risk of injuries or the coach might change formation.
While it is unquestionable that such decisions may play a role, the advantage of having a
natural experiment is that the teamscharacteristics are uncorrelated with the treatment
e¤ect. Thus, additional strategic behavior should be uncorrelated with the treatment e¤ect,
i.e. the order of the advantage, as we control for the two main potential causes of order
e¤ects. Furthermore, in other sports like National Basketball Association (NBA) basketball,
teams might be more likely to intentionally lose games at the end of the regular season be-
cause of the incentives they face (Taylor and Trogdon, 2002). This is not a concern in our
setting, where the seedings for the tournament depend on the end-of-year rankings in the
national leagues and (nancial) incentives to compete in every game of the tournaments are
very high.18 An additional concern might be that our setting is not perfectly symmetric.
Even though 93% of the knock-outs nish after the second game, a minority continues to
supplementary times (4%) and eventually nishes after the penalty kicks (3%), as is shown
in Table 2. In knock-outs where the competition is tight, S might adopt a strategy which
increases the probability of reaching the extra time. Then S will be playing the extra time
18See footnote 15.
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at home, where it has an advantage.19 While these issues might be a concern, players are
highly paid professionals who exactly know the setting of the game and have high incentives
to pass the knock-out round. If they could get advantaged by their order of home play, they
would exploit this advantage. At optimum, coaches and players maximize their winning
probability given the random order of home play.
6 Conclusion
Tournaments are widely used for two main purposes: as a selection mechanism and to provide
incentives to work hard. While many tournaments are dynamic, little is known about the
e¤ect of revealing information during the tournament on participantse¤ort and risk choices.
We focus on the selection e¢ ciency of dynamic tournaments. If the structure of multi-game
tournaments systematically distorts winning probabilities because of leading-e¤ects or risk-
taking, tournaments may not be an e¢ cient selection mechanism when multiple repetition
under di¤erent conditions is needed. Some players could benet from an advantaged posi-
tion and the winner may not be the best participant, but the luckiest one. In this paper, we
analyze the presence of order e¤ects in dynamic tournaments with asymmetric conditions.
We dene order e¤ects as whether the random order of a temporary advantage for a team
in multi-game tournaments has an impact on its probability of winning. From a theoretical
perspective two alternative and opposing hypotheses have been proposed. First, there might
be a leading-e¤ect. The winner of the rst game faces a higher e¤ective prizefrom win-
ning the second game than the rst-game loser. This encourages the leading team and/or
discourages the team lagging behind to exert e¤ort. Second, agents lagging behind might
increase risk-taking as they have nothing to lose.
Using a natural experiment with 1,146 observations in professional sports competitions where
highly paid professionals play in tournaments with strong (nancial) incentives, we develop
an empirical strategy to distinguish between the two order e¤ects highlighted by theoretical
work on tournaments: leading-e¤ect and risk-taking. In two-game soccer knock-out com-
petitions, teams are randomly drawn to play either the rst or second game at home, and
thus have an advantage either early in the knock-out round or later. Before analyzing the
conditional winning probability on the randomly assigned order of the advantage we pro-
vide evidence that risk-taking is constant across games and does not increase in response
to negative past performance. Our empirical evidence suggests that players anticipate the
opponents risk-taking across games and adapt their risk-taking behaviour accordingly. The
19We performed the leading-e¤ect analysis on di¤erent sub-samples depending on when the knock-out
ended (regular time, extra time and penalty kicks), but results were unchanged.
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team playing the rst game at home, F , anticipates that the opponent might lag behind and
increase risk-taking in the second game. Consequently, F increases risk-taking in the rst
game as well, and risk choices are constant across games.
As we do not nd any evidence of risk-taking, we perform a series of regressions relating
the winning probability to the order of the advantage and other covariates. We nd that
teams have statistically the same winning probability irrespective of whether they have an
advantage in the rst or second game. Using a unique and large dataset with 1,146 games
where advantages are randomly assigned, we show that teams playing rst (second) home
win 48.2% (51.8%) of the knock-outs, not statistically di¤erent from 50% with a p-value of
.31. In the regression analysis we conrm this nding using a logistic regression model with
clustered standard errors at knock-out-ID. In addition, we add other control variables as
time xed e¤ects, type of tournament and knock-out round dummy variables. The results
are unchanged. In all specications, the order of the advantage is never signicant.
Our ndings using team sport data are consistent with Ferrall and Smith (1999). In con-
trast, papers using data on individuals as Malueg and Yates (2010) and Genakos and Pagliero
(2012) nd evidence of strategic e¤ects. A possible explanation for this di¤erence between
teams and individuals is provided by Ferrall and Smith (1999) who argue that incentives
within teams may attenuate incentives between teams. Our results suggest that if the set-
ting is known by participants and individuals are competing in teams the timing of symmetric
advantages seems irrelevant. This guarantees selection e¢ ciency and fairness for participants.
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7 Appendix
There are four ways of winning the knock-out, which apply in the following order. First,
the goal di¤erence rule states that the team that scores more goals on aggregate in the two
games qualies for the next knock-out round. Second, the away goals rule prescribes that
if the two teams score the same number of goals over the two games, the team that scores
more away goals qualies for the next knock-out round. Third, Article 7 of the Regulations
of the UEFA Champions League 2008/09 states that if both teams score the same number
of goals at home and away, two 15-minute periods of extra time are played at the end of the
second leg. Fourth, if no goals are scored during extra time, kicks from the penalty mark
(...) determine which club qualies for the next stage.
The knock-out competition is structured in six steps.
1) Teams F and S are randomly allocated to play either the rst or the second game at
home.
2) The rst game is played. Assume without loss of generality that F is the home team in
the rst game.
3) The second game is played (S is the home team now).
4) If the sum of the goals of S is strictly larger (smaller) than those of F , the game ends
and S (F ) wins the knock-out. If the sums are equal, the team that scored more away goals
wins. If also the away goals are equal the game continues at Ss venue.
5) Supplementary time is played. The team that scores more goals in the supplementary
time wins.
6) If both teams score the same number of goals, penalty kicks are used to determine the
winner.
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
The continuation of the game at Ss venue could be the explanation for the higher point
estimate of teams playing the second game home, 51.8%. As we show in Table 3, there is no
signicant advantage from playing second, but the fact that the game is played on the eld
of the team playing home second is certainly a small advantage. The percentage of games
ending after the second game for the entire dataset with 1,146 observations is 93%, while
4% of the games end after supplementary times and 3% after penalty kicks. The probability
of winning for S conditional on reaching supplementary time (penalty kicks) is 57% (55%),
not signicantly di¤erent from 50%.
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9 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary of the data
Competition Phase Time Period
1955-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 1955-2009
Champions League Final KO Round 502 80 28 610
Europa League Overall 0 0 536 536
Final KO Round 0 0 456 456
KO Round of last 16 0 0 80 80
Note: One observation is one game. Overall number of observations: 1,146. Final Knock-Out (KO) Round comprehends
quarter- and semi-finals. We only consider games where the order of the home advantage is randomly assigned by the
UEFA.
Table 2: UEFA regulation, passing the knock-out round and home advantage
UEFA Regulation Observations Frequency Home Result Observations Frequency
Goal difference 929 0.81 Home win 611 0.53
Away goals rule 139 0.12 Home draw 300 0.26
Supplementary time 42 0.04 Home defeat 235 0.21
Penalty kicks 36 0.03
Note: There are several ways of passing the knock-out round as discussed in the appendix. This table summarizes the relative
importance of each of them. The ‘goal difference’regulation is the most important one. For a detailed description of the
regulation see UEFA.com. ‘Home Result’is defined as the result from the perspective of the home team, irrespective of whether
it is the first or second game of the knock-out. One observation is one game. Overall number of observations: 1,146. We only
consider games where the order of the home advantage is randomly assigned by the UEFA.
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Table 3: The absence of order e¤ects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Binary Dependent Variable: Win the knock-out=1; Lose=0
Second Home (SH) 0.175 0.0873 0.0413 0.177 0.108 -0.0288
(0.167) (0.296) (0.300) (0.190) (0.203) (0.315)
Round of last 16*SH 0.385 0.392
(0.353) (0.348)
Quarter Final*SH 0.123 0.172
(0.195) (0.424)
Semi Final*SH -0.0382 -0.00463
(0.237) (0.448)
Champions League*SH 0.466 -0.00431 0.419
(0.413) (0.168) (0.556)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.0873 -0.0873 -0.0873 -0.0873 -0.0873 -0.0873
(0.0837) (0.0837) (0.0837) (0.0837) (0.0837) (0.0837)
Observations 1,146 1,134 1,134 1,146 1,146 1,134
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by knock-out-ID in parentheses. The results do not change qualitatively if the
probit regression model is used instead of the logit model. Year Dummy is a binary variable which indicates the year
in which the knock-out is played. One observation is one game. We only consider games where the order of the home
advantage is randomly assigned by the UEFA. 6 observations from Saison 1968 and 6 observations from Saison 2001
are dropped due to collinearity in specifications 2, 3 and 6.
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Figure 1: Results in the First Game (FG) and Second Game (SG)
Note: Figure 1 shows the frequency of outcomes (home (win), draw, away (win)) in the first and
second game of the knock-out. The square dot represents the percentage of each result, while the
square around the dot represents the 95% confidence interval (CI) around the mean. The square
(diamond) represents the results in the first (second) game. FG (SG) refers to the first (second) game
of the knock-out. The main result shown in Figure 1 is that the distribution of outcomes is statistically
the same across games, a result confirmed by a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov where we
cannot reject the null of equal distributions across games at a p-value of .89.
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Figure 2: Sum of home and away goals by game
Note: Figure 2 shows the distribution of the sum of home and away team goals in the first and second
game. The dotted (normal) bar represents the first (second) game. While the average number of goals in
the second game is slightly higher than in the first game (2.7 vs. 2.48) a non-parametric Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test cannot reject that the distributions are equal across games with a p-value of .24. This
shows that risk-taking measured by the distribution of the sum of goals is constant across games.
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Figure 3: Past performance and risk-taking
Note: Figure 3 shows the relation between the sum of home and away goals in the second game (left
y-axis) and the goal difference (home-away) in the first game (x-axis). In addition, the observations
(knock-outs; on the right y-axis) to compute the mean, the interquartile range and the 95% confidence
interval (CI) are reported. One observation is one knock-out round consisting of the first and second
game. We restrict the sample to goal-differences with more than 10 observations. A total of 12 knock-
outs with goal-differences greater (lower) than 4 (-3) are dropped. The main result of Figure 3 is that
the sum of home and away goals in the second game is independent from the goal difference in the
first game. If teams lagging behind increase risk-taking we would expect the sum of goals to increase
with the absolute goal difference in the first game. The independence between these variables
provides further evidence that teams do not change risk-taking as a response to past performance.
24
Figure 4: Description of knock-out structure
S vs. F F vs. S Supplementarytimes Penalty kicks
time
Game 1 Game 2
Ends:
F or S wins
Venue: F Venue: SVenue: S Venue: S
2 to 3 weeks No time interval No time interval
93% 4% 3%
Ends:
F or S wins
Ends:
F or S wins
Note: F (S) denotes the team playing the first (second) game at home. The arrows indicate the progress of the
knock-out. 93% of the knock-outs end after the second game, 4% end after supplementary times and 3% end after
penalty kicks.
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